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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JULIE WARREN VERDE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20954 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was there insufficient evidence to support a 
verdict finding that defendant had committed a violation of 
§76-7-203, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended 1973), sale 
of a child, where defendant never told the prosecutrix that she 
would not place a child with her if the prosecutrix did not pay 
some of defendant's personal medical expenses, where the only 
sums of money discussed between defendant and the prosecutrix 
dealt with possible legal fees and medical expenses and defendant 
never demanded payment of money or other thing of value as 
consideration for placing a child with the prosecutrix? 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error when 
it failed to instruct the jury as to all of the elements, 
including the exceptions, of the crime of sale of a child? 
3. Was defendant denied effective assistance of 
counsel under the facts and circumstances of this case? 
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4. D i d t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n by 
a l l o w i n g , o v e r d e f e n s e o b j e c t i o n , a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s t o 
t e s t i f y a s t o t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s e m o t i o n a l s t a t e and s u i c i d e 
a t t e m p t a f t e r F e b r u a r y 1, 1985? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
D e f e n d a n t , a 2 6 - y e a r o l d m a r r i e d woman w i t h a 
t h r e e - y e a r o l d d a u g h t e r , was c o n v i c t e d on S e p t e m b e r 5 , 1 9 8 5 , 
o f v i o l a t i o n of § 7 6 - 7 - 2 0 3 , U.C.A. ( 1 9 5 3 , as amended 1 9 7 3 ) , s a l e 
o f a b a b y , a t h i r d d e g r e e f e l o n y . ( S e e Addendum 1 . ) The 
v i o l a t i o n a l l e g e d l y o c c u r r e d F e b r u a r y 1 , 1 9 8 5 . A j u r y t r i a l 
was h e l d J u n e 5 - 6 , 1 9 8 5 , w i t h t h e H o n o r a b l e Homer F . W i l k i n s o n , 
J u d g e , p r e s i d i n g . An e i g h t - p e r s o n j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y 
as c h a r g e d . (R. 63) Judge W i l k i n s o n o r d e r e d d e f e n d a n t commi t t ed 
t o t h e U t a h S t a t e H o s p i t a l f o r a 3 0 - d a y p r e s e n t e n c e e v a l u a t i o n . 
(R. 7 2 ; s e e Addendum 2 . ) 
D e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e s e n t e n c e 
o f up t o f i v e y e a r s i n p r i s o n p r o v i d e d by law and p l a c e d on 
p r o b a t i o n on c o n d i t i o n s h e s e r v e n i n e m o n t h s i n c o u n t y j a i l 
( r e d u c e d b y 90 d a y s i f d e f e n d a n t p e r f o r m e d communi ty s e r v i c e ) 
a n d p a y a f i n e o f $ 2 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . Her s e n t e n c e was m o d i f i e d on 
November 1 8 , 1 9 8 5 , by r e d u c i n g t h e j a i l t e r m t o t h r e e m o n t h s . 
(See Addendum 3 . ) 
D e f e n d a n t ' s s e n t e n c e h a s b e e n s t a y e d p e n d i n g t h i s 
a p p e a l s i n c e J a n u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 8 6 , t h e d a t e t h e Utah Supreme Cour t 
g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s a p p l i c a t i o n f o r c e r t i f i c a t e of p r o b a b l e 
c a u s e . She i s r e l e a s e d u n d e r a bond s e t by J u d g e W i l k i n s o n . 
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The f a c t s and c i rcumstances which led to defendant 's a r r e s t and 
subsequent conviction follow. 
D e f e n d a n t , J u l i e W a r r e n V e r d e , f i r s t met t h e 
p r o s e c u t r i x , Tammy Watson, when defendant consu l t ed Dr. Ray 
Barton r ega rd ing t r e a t m e n t for weight r e d u c t i o n in June 1984. 
(Tr. 10) Mrs. Watson, a medical a s s i s t a n t in Dr. Barton fs off ice 
(Tr . 9 ) , was p r e g n a n t . (Tr . 12) She subsequent ly suffered a 
miscarr iage in September, 1984. (Tr. 12) 
Defendant v i s i t e d Dr. B a r t o n ' s o f f i c e on a weekly or 
b i -week ly b a s i s to r e c e i v e i n j e c t i o n s of vitamin B-l and other 
m e d i c a t i o n s . The in jec t ions cost $6.00 or $8.50 each, depending 
on the type r e c e i v e d . (Tr. 15-16) Shortly af ter Mrs. Watson's 
m i s c a r r i a g e , the defendant made a regular v i s i t to Dr. Bar ton 's 
o f f i c e . (Tr . 12-13) When defendant l ea rned of Mrs. Watson's 
m i s c a r r i a g e , defendant asked her i f she and her husband would 
be i n t e r e s t e d in p r i v a t e l y adopt ing a ch i ld . (Tr. 13) Defen-
dan t , through her church, had been g e t t i n g information from a 
p r o - l i f e group in another s t a t e about adoption as an a l t e r n a t i v e 
to abor t ion . (Tr. 214) 
Defendan t t o l d t h e p r o s e c u t r i x t h a t she knew of a 
p regnan t woman who was due to d e l i v e r in December, 1984, and 
who was cons ider ing placing the chi ld for adoption. (Tr. 13-14, 
220) Mrs. Watson and her husband to ld the defendant they were 
i n t e r e s t e d in adopting. (Tr. 14) 
The defendant and Mrs. Watson discussed at torney fees 
and h o s p i t a l expenses to consummate the adoption. (Tr. 14-15, 
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220-221/ 223) According to Mrs. Watson, the defendant initially 
quoted approximate medical expenses of $2/000.00 to $5/000.00 
and legal fees of $500.00. (Tr. 15) Defendant denied quoting 
any specific amount for medical expenses (Tr. 248), although 
she agreed she had quoted legal fees of $500.00. (Tr. 223) 
No funds ever exchanged hands specifically for the purchase of 
a child/ nor for any other expenses having to do with an adoption 
procedure. (Tr. 102) Defendant never did ask prosecutrix to 
pay her money for any adoption services. (Tr. 104) Defendant 
and the prosecutrix never discussed how much money defendant 
would get out of the transaction/ if any. (Tr. 71) 
In the months of October, 1984/ through January, 1985, 
Mrs. Watson paid for defendant's vitamin B-l injections. (Tr. 
98) Defendant testified that there was no agreement that Mrs. 
Watson would pay for the shots because defendant was helping 
her with the adoption (Tr. 240), while Mrs. Watson testified 
that because defendant would give her a reduction on the attorney 
fees for the adoption, Mrs. Watson agreed to pay for defendant's 
vitamin B-l injections. (Tr. 15) Defendant denied that she 
had told the prosecutrix the attorney's fees would be 
discounted. (Tr. 244) Defendant did not know Mrs. Watson was 
paying for her injections (Tr. 269), since Mrs. Watson told her 
"they were on the house." (Tr. 269) In any event, the shots 
Mrs. Watson paid for totalled approximately $80-90. (Tr. 62) 
From October through January/ defendant and the prose-
cutrix were in regular contact, in person and by phone, concern-
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ing the p o s s i b i l i t y of adopting a ch i ld . (Tr. 18-19, 246) While 
a t t o r n e y ' s fees and h o s p i t a l expenses were discussed, defendant 
neve: to ld the p r o s e c u t r i x t h a t defendant would charge a fee 
as we l l . (Tr. 104) Mrs. Watson and her mother, Dorothy Jackson, 
were p e r m i t t e d to t e s t i f y a t l e n g t h , w i thou t object ion, about 
t h e i r various purchases of c lo th ing , a c r i b , a car seat and other 
i tems purchased in a n t i c i p a t i o n of the adop t ion . (Tr. 21-27, 
29-38, 63, 134-136) Photographs of some of these i tems were 
admi t ted i n t o evidence over defense counsel o b j e c t i o n . (Tr . 
202-203, 206) 
Defendant t e s t i f i e d tha t the woman who was considering 
p l a c i n g h e r c h i l d changed her mind. (Tr . 223) Rather than 
d i s a p p o i n t the Watsons by t e l l i n g them of t h i s turn of events , 
defendant a t tempted to find another woman w i l l i n g to give her 
chi ld up for adoption. (Tr. 208-209, 223-224) 
In e a r l y January , 1985, defendant 's best fr iend, June 
Burkhardt, and her three young daughters (Tr. 184-185) a l l became 
i l l with s t r e p and v i r a l i n f ec t i ons . (Tr. 189, 194-195) Since 
Mrs . B u r k h a r d t was t oo i l l t o c a r e for he r c h i l d r e n , the 
de fendan t , who was a l s o s ick (Tr . 227) , a r ranged to place the 
chi ldren with fr iends u n t i l Mrs. Burkhardt recovered su f f i c i en t l y 
to resume caring for them. (Tr. 198) 
Defendan t t e s t i f i e d t h a t she c a l l e d x*,rs, *atson, 
exp la ined the s i t u a t i o n and asked her to t empora r i ly care for 
Emlee, Mrs . B u r k h a r d t ' s 13-month o ld daugh te r , u n t i l Mrs. 
Burkhardt !s condit ion improved. (Tr. 227) Mrs. Watson t e s t i f i e d 
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that the defendant told her she could have Emlee for a "trial 
period." (Tr. 48) The defendant brought Emlee to Mrs. Watson 
on the evening of January 4, 1985, (Tr. 47-48) and took her back 
on the 6th (Tr. 51), and returned her to the Watsons on the 7th. 
(Tr. 53) Mrs. Watson testified that defendant took Emlee back 
again on the 13th of January (Tr. 54), while defendant and Mrs. 
Burkhardt testifed that Emlee was returned to Mrs. Burkhardt 
on January 11. (Tr. 199, 256-257) 
Defendant testified that she took Emlee back to Mrs. 
Watson on the 7th because Mrs. Burkhardt was still unable to 
care for the children herself. (Tr. 230) Mrs. Burkhardt 
testified that once she had the children back on the 6th, she 
realized she still could not care for them and asked defendant 
to take the children again and send them to friends1 homes for 
care. (Tr. 198) Mrs. Burkhardt knew that defendant was not 
caring for her daughters personally. (Tr. 196-197) Defendant 
admitted that she told Mrs. Watson, sometime after Mrs. Watsor 
agreed to take Emlee the second time, that Emlee was available 
for adoption. (Tr. 230-231) Mrs. Watson never asked defendant 
why she was getting a 13-month old child instead of a newborn. 
(Tr. 86) 
On the 7th, defendant and Mrs. Watson met in a Free 
Meyer parking lot at which time defendant gave Emlee to the 
prosecutrix. (Tr. 53) Defendant asked the prosecutrix for gas 
money and the prosecutrix gave her $5.00. (Tr. 53-54) 
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Mr< . Watson was permitted to testify at length, without 
objection, regarding her purchases of '"lothas, medicine and toys 
for Emlee* (Tr. 55) She was also permitted to show the jury 
a photograph of her husband and Emlee, without objection. (Tr. 
64) 
Sometime after defendant took Emlee back the second 
time (January 11 or 13, 1985), the i:seoL,trix contacted the 
police. (Tr. 56) Thereafter, at police request, Mrs. Watson 
called defendant and asked when she could see Emlee again. (Tr. 
94) They arranged to meet at 9 a.m. on February 1, again at 
Fred Meyer. (Tr. 59) 
On February 1, defendant asked Mrs. Burkhardt if she 
could have Emlee for the day, although she did not tell her she 
was taking Emlee to see the prosecutrix. (Tr. 185-186, 265) 
The defendant testified she told the prosecutrix that she could 
have Emlee on a visitation basis and that she told the prose-
cutrix to bring Emlee back at 5 p.m. that day. (Tr. 238) Mrs. 
Watson stated that when defendant put Emlee in the car, she said 
the baby was hers now. (Tr. 60) No discussion of money or 
arrangement for payment took place at that time. (Tr. 61) 
Two Salt Lake City Police investigators were keeping 
watch* ( 'I r . 60) As defendant left the parking lot, she was 
stopped by the two detectives for questioning. (Tr. 150) She 
was subsequently charged by information with violation of 
§76-7-203. At trial, Mrs. Watson testified that when she knew 
she was not going to be able to adopt: a baby, she attempted to 
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c o m m i t s u i c i d e . The p r o s e c u t i o n w i t h d r e w t h e q u e s t i o n when 
o b j e c t i o n w a s m a d e . ( T r . 6 2 - 6 3 ) H o w e v e r , M r s . W a t s o n ' s 
e m p l o y e r , D r . B a r t o n , was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y as t o t h i s i n c i d e n t 
and t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s e m o t i o n a l s t a t e o v e r d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s 
o b j e c t i o n . ( T r . 1 6 5 ) A f r i e n d o f t h e p r o s e c u t r i x , T a n i a 
L e o n a r d , w a s p e r m i t t e d t o t e s t i f y a b o u t t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s 
e m o t i o n a l s t a t e , t h i s t i m e w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n . ( T r . 125-126) 
Mr. A l a n D. F r a n d s e n , d e f e n d a n t ' s t r i a l a t t o r n e y , d i d 
n o t p r e p a r e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on d e f e n d a n t ' s t h e o r y of t h e c a s e ; 
and a s a d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e j u r y was n o t i n s t r u c t e d t h a t 
p a y m e n t of l e g a l and m e d i c a l f e e s i s n o t an o f f e n s e unde r t h e 
s t a t u t e . (R . 3 1 - 3 9 , 4 0 - 6 2 ) At t r i a l , Mr. F r a n d s e n , w i t h o u t 
o b j e c t i o n , a l l o w e d t h e p r o s e c u t o r t o c o n d u c t i r r e l e v a n t l i n e s 
o f q u e s t i o n i n g r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s p u r c h a s e s i n 
a n t i c i p a t i o n of a d o p t i o n ( T r . 2 1 - 2 7 , 3 0 - 3 2 , 5 5 , 1 3 4 - 1 3 6 ) and 
f a i l e d t o o b j e c t t o t h e a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e of such p u r c h a s e s 
( T r . 2 0 3 ) ; a l l o w e d a w i t n e s s t o t e s t i f y t o t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s 
e m o t i o n a l s t a t e a f t e r d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d ( T r . 1 2 5 - 1 2 7 ) ; and 
a l l o w e d w i t n e s s e s t o t e s t i f y as t o i n a d m i s s i b l e h e a r s a y ( T r . 110 , 
1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 , 1 2 6 - 1 2 7 , 1 8 2 ) . 
S u b s e q u e n t t o h e r c o n v i c t i o n , d e f e n d a n t d i s c h a r g e d 
h e r t r i a l a t t o r n e y and r e t a i n e d R o b e r t Van S c i v e r t o r e p r e s e n t 
h e r on t h i s a p p e a l . 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
1 . S e c t i o n 7 6 - 7 - 2 0 3 d e c l a r e s i t i l l e g a l f o r any p e r s o n 
t o s e l l , o r a t t e m p t t o s e l l , a c h i l d " f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
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of the payment of money or other thing of value. . . .M The 
statute specifically excepts payment of medical expenses, while 
another Utah statute permits payment of legal fees for services 
rendered in connection with an adoption procedure (§55-8a-l(4)). 
The jury was never informed of these exceptions. The evidence 
at trial showed that the sums discussed between the prosecutrix 
and the defendant always concerned medical and legal expenses. 
Defendant never demanded the money personally for her assistance 
in the placement process, nor did any funds exchange hands either 
for the sale of a child or any other adoption related expenses. 
The evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict of 
guilt of violation of §76-7-203. 
2. The trial judge had an affirmative duty to instruct 
the jury as to the exceptions to the offense of sale of a child, 
despite defense counsel's failure to offer such an instruction 
or to object to the lack of such an instruction. The jury was 
not instructed that payment of medical expenses or legal fees 
are permissible expenditures and do not constitute a violation 
of §76-7-203. The conviction should therefore be reversed in 
order to prevent manifest injustice. 
3. Defense counsel at trial committed several errors 
in his representation of defendant, including failure to ensure 
that the jury was instructed regarding the exceptions to the 
offense charged, failure to object to (1) the introduction of 
irrelevant testimony concerning the purchases of baby items, 
(2) irrelevant testimony concerning the prosecutrix's emotional 
10 
s t a t e o n c e s h e k n e w s h e w o u l d n o t be a d o p t i n g a c h i l d w i t h 
d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s i s t a n c e a n d ( 3 ) s t a t e m e n t s of i n a d m i s s i b l e 
h e a r s a y . Such e r r o r s d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t h e r r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l , a s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and 
Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n s . 
4 . T h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n p e r m i t t i n g t h e 
p r o s e c u t r i x ' s e m p l o y e r t o t e s t i f y , o v e r d e f e n s e c o u n s e l 
o b j e c t i o n , a s t o t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s e m o t i o n a l s t a t e and a t t e m p t e d 
s u i c i d e a f t e r F e b r u a r y 1 , 1 9 8 5 * T h i s e v i d e n c e was i r r e l e v a n t 
t o t h e i s s u e w h e t h e r on F e b r u a r y 1 , 1 9 8 5 , d e f e n d a n t d i d s e l l , 
o r a t t e m p t t o s e l l , a c h i l d t o t h e p r o s e c u t r i x and s h o u l d h a v e 
b e e n e x c l u d e d . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e e v i d e n c e was such t h a t i t was 
e x t r e m e l y l i k e l y t o p r e j u d i c e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e eyes of t h e j u r y 
by c r e a t i n g sympathy f o r t h e p r o s e c u t r i x . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT FINDING DEFENDANT GUILTY OF SALE 
OF A CHILD. 
D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d and c o n v i c t e d of v i o l a t i o n of 
§ 7 6 - 7 - 2 0 3 , U . C . A . ( 1 9 5 3 , a s amended 1 9 7 3 ) . ( S e e Addendum 1.) 
The s t a t u t e r e a d s as f o l l o w s : 
Sjil^e o f C h i l d - - Any p e r s o n , w h i l e 
h a v i n g c u s t o d y , c a r e , c o n t r o l , o r p o s s e s s i o n 
o f a n y c h i l d , who s e l l s , o r d i s p o s e s o f , 
o r a t t e m p t s t o s e l l o r d i s p o s e of, any c h i l d 
f o r and i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e p a y m e n t of 
money o r o t h e r t h i n g of v a l u e i s g u i l t y of 
a f e l o n y o f t h e t h i r d d e g r e e ; p r o v i d e d , 
h o w e v e r , t h i s s e c t i o n s h a l l n o t make i t 
u n l a w f u l f o r a n y p e r s o n , a g e n c y , o r 
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corporation to pay the actual and reasonable 
maternity, connected medical or hospital 
and necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement as an act 
of charity, so long as payment is not made 
for the purpose of inducing the mother, 
parent, or legal guardian to place the child 
for adoption, consent to the adoption, or 
cooperate in the completion of the adoption. 
It is thus illegal for a person to dispose of, or 
attempt to dispose of, a child "for and in consideration of the 
payment of money or other thing of value. . . . " It is not 
illegal, however, to pay medical and other expenses necessarily 
connected with the birth and adoption, so long as such payment 
is not inducement for the adoption. 
Although the statute was enacted in 1973, defendant, 
after diligent research, has been unable to find any Utah Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting the statute and the elements 
necessary for a conviction. The issue of whether, under the 
facts brought out at trial, an offense in contravention of this 
statute actually occurred is therefore novel. An interpretation 
of the elements necessary to convict a person under §76-7-203 
is of course integral to defendant's conviction in this case. 
As pointed out in a recent case, where a defendant 
alleges that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
conviction— 
[T]he standard of review is narrow. 
" [W]e review the evidence and all inferences 
which may reasonably be drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, 
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
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i n h e r e n t l y improbable t ha t reasonable minds 
must have e n t e r t a i n e d a r ea sonab le doubt 
t h a t t he defendant committed the crime of 
which he was c o n v i c t e d . " S t a t e v . Pe t ree , 
U tah , 659 P .2d 4 4 3 , 444 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; accord , 
S t a t e v . M c C a r d e l l , U tah , 65 2 P. 2d 942, 
945 T1982J . In reviewing the c o n v i c t i o n , 
we do not s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for tha t 
of the j u r y . " I t i s the exclusive function 
of t h e j u r y t o weigh the evidence and to 
de termine the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses 
• " S t a t e v . Lamm, Utah , 606 P. 2d 
2 2 9 ,231 ( 1 9 8 0 ) ; a c c o r d , S t a t e v . Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983) . So long 
a s t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e , i n c l u d i n g 
r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s , from which f indings 
of a l l the r e q u i s i t e e lements of the crime 
can r easonab ly be made, our i n q u i r y s tops . 
c £ - ' S t a t e v . P e t r e e , 659 P. 2d a t 447 
("no evidence t h a t the defendant " in t en t ion -
a l l y or knowingly" caused the death of the 
v i c t i m in p r o s e c u t i o n for second degree 
murder). 
S ta te v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah, 1985) 
T h i s a n a l y s i s p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s 
r e p r e s e n t e d by competent defense counsel who has taken every 
r e a s o n a b l e measure dur ing the course of the t r i a l to p r o t e c t 
the defendant 's i n t e r e s t s . In t h i s case, the jury v/as ins t ruc ted 
t h a t the e lements neces sa ry for d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n under 
§76-7-203 were: 
1 . That on or a b o u t t h e 1s t day of 
February , 1985, in S a l t Lake County, S ta te 
of Utah, the de fendan t , J u l i e Warren Verde, 
had c u s t o d y , c a r e , c o n t r o l and p o s s e s s i o n 
of any ch i ld ; and 
2. That the defendant: 
a. sold or disposed of, or 
b . a t tempted to s e l l or d i spose 
of said ch i ld ; and 
3. That the defendant did so: 
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a . f o r and in c o n s i d e r a t i o n of 
the payment of money, or 
b . for other thing of value; and 
4. That the defendant committed such 
ac t i n t e n t i o n a l l y or knowingly. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s R e q u e s t e d J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 (R. 3 1 ) , 
Ins t ruc t ions to the Jury No. 12 (R. 49). (See Addendum 7.) 
The ju ry was never i n s t r u c t e d as to the exception contained in 
the second half of the s t a t u t e and the exception for legal fees . 
As d i s c u s s e d i n Argument I I # i n f r a , f a i l u r e to i n s t r u c t as 
to a l l the e lements of §76-7-203, including the exceptions, was 
p l a i n e r r o r . I t no doubt confused the jury as to what sums of 
money d i s c u s s e d dur ing the t r i a l would v i o l a t e the s t a t u t e . 
This confusion can be i n f e r r e d from the f ac t i t took the jury 
over 8-1/2 hours to reach a v e r d i c t in t h i s case . (Tr. 285, 
289) 
Even if the complaining wi tness ' s testimony is believed 
i n t o t o , t h e r e i s no c r i m e under §76 -7 -203 p roved by the 
e v i d e n c e . Mrs . Watson t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t most d e f e n d a n t 
r e c e i v e d $95.00 from her—$80 to $90 in shots and $5.00 for gas 
money. (Tr . 62, 53-54) Mrs. Watson never t e s t i f i e d tha t she 
p a i d for d e f e n d a n t ' s i n j e c t i o n s or gave her money for gas as 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n fo r r e c e i p t of a c h i l d , nor did she say t h a t 
t h e defendant demanded the money and t h a t she would not have 
been a b l e t o a d o p t a c h i l d t h r o u g h d e f e n d a n t b u t for the 
payment of t he se sums. I t h a r d l y seems l i k e l y t h a t a person 
a c t u a l l y i n t e n d i n g to s e l l a c h i l d would do so for $85 to $95. 
14 
This seems p a r t i c u l a r l y i n c r e d i b l e since the child in question 
belonged to d e f e n d a n t ' s bes t friend and the c h i l d ' s mother knew 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had taken her on February 1, the day the 
offense a l legedly occurred. (Tr. 185-186, 265) 
Even the complaining witness t e s t i f i e d tha t the larger 
sums d i s c u s s e d were always in the con tex t of a t t o r n e y ' s fees 
and medical expenses . (Tr . 15) No funds ever exchanged hands 
s p e c i f i c a l l y for the purchase of a c h i l d , nor for any o the r 
expenses having to do with an adopt ion p r o c e d u r e . (Tr . 102) 
Defendant never did ask p r o s e c u t r i x to pay her money for any 
a d o p t i o n s e r v i c e s ( T r . 1 0 4 ) , not even on February 1, 1985, 
the day she a l l e g e d l y committed t h i s crime by b r i n g i n g Emlee 
to the complaining witness and placing her in Mrs. Watson's ca r . 
(Tr . 61) In a d d i t i o n , the complaining w i tne s s t e s t i f i e d t ha t 
defendant t o ld her tha t the large sums discussed ($2,0Q0-$5,000) 
would be paid to the lawyer handling the adoption. (Tr. 10) 
The evidence i s t h e r e f o r e such t ha t , even when viewed 
in the l i g h t most f avorab le to the verd ic t , fairminded persons 
must have e n t e r t a i n e d a r e a s o n a b l e doubt as to d e f e n d a n t ' s 
g u i l t . S t a t e v . M i l l s , 530 P . 2d 1272, 1273 (Utah, 1975); 
S t a t e v . Gor l i ck , 605 P.2d 761, 762 (Utah, 1979) . Defendant 
b e l i e v e s t h a t when the testimony presented at t r i a l i s examined 
under t h i s t e s t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t she should not have been 
conv ic t ed of the crime of s a l e of a c h i l d and would not have 
been but for the C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to properly i n s t r u c t the jury 
as to the prohibi ted and permitted elements of §76-7-203, defense 
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counsel's ineffective representation at trial and the admission 
into evidence of the prosecutrix's suicide attempt. Conviction 
under this statute requires proof that a person sold or disposed 
of# or attempted to do so, a child "in consideration for the 
payment of money or other thing of value" and that such payment 
did not fall under the statutory exceptions. This the prosecu-
tion has failed to do in the case under review and defendant's 
conviction should be reversed. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ALL 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF SALE OF A CHILD. 
S e c t i o n 7 6 - 7 - 2 0 3 / U.C.A. ( 1 9 5 3 , a s amended 1 9 7 3 ) , s e t s 
o u t a l l t h e e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v e t h e c r i m e of s a l e of 
a c h i l d . ( S e e A d d e n d u m 1 . ) T h e s t a t u t e a l s o s e t s o u t an 
e x c e p t i o n i f t h e p a y m e n t o f money o r o t h e r t h i n g o f v a l u e i s 
f o r " a c t u a l a n d r e a s o n a b l e m a t e r n i t y , c o n n e c t e d m e d i c a l o r 
h o s p i t a l a n d n e c e s s a r y l i v i n g e x p e n s e s of t h e m o t h e r " n o t 
i n t e n d e d a s i n d u c e m e n t t o p l a c e t h e c h i l d f o r a d o p t i o n . I n 
a d d i t i o n , of c o u r s e , payment of l e g a l f e e s n e c e s s a r y t o c o m p l e t e 
t h e a d o p t i o n i s p e r m i s s i b l e . ( § 5 5 - 8 a - l ( 4 ) , U . C . A . ( 1 9 5 3 , a s 
amended 1 9 8 4 ) ; s e e Addendum 5) 
The j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s s u b m i t t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t o r (R. 
3 1 , 38) and d e l i v e r e d t o t h e j u r y v e r b a t i m by t h e Cour t (R. 4 9 , 
5 0 ; Addendum 4) m e n t i o n o n l y t h e c r i m i n a l e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y 
t o c o n v i c t and do n o t i n c l u d e t h e e x c e p t i o n e l e m e n t s of e i t h e r 
§ 7 6 - 7 - 2 0 3 o r § 5 5 - 8 a - l ( 4 ) . 
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Defense counsel did not object to any of the jury 
instructions (Tr. 285), and the record does not reflect that 
defense counsel submitted any proposed instructions of his own. 
However, " [notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error 
may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice." §77-35-19(c), U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1980). (See 
Addendum 6.) 
In conformity with this rule, the Utah Supreme Court 
has held— 
This Court w i l l n o t i c e the f a i l u r e to 
g ive an i n s t r u c t i o n even though i t was not 
r e q u e s t e d when the f a i l u r e to do so would 
p l a i n l y r e s u l t in a miscarriage of j u s t i c e . 
S t a t e v . Day, 572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah, 1977). See a l so , S ta te 
v . P i e r r e n , 583 P.2d 69, 71 (Utah, 19 78) ; S t a t e v . Les l ey , 
672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah, 1983). 
The q u e s t i o n t h u s a r i s e s as to what c o n s t i t u t e s a 
"manifes t i n j u s t i c e " or " m i s c a r r i a g e of j u s t i c e . " The highest 
c o u r t s of s e v e r a l s t a t e s , i n c l u d i n g the Supreme Court of Utah, 
have examined t h i s i s s u e . "The gene ra l r u l e i s : An accurate 
i n s t r u c t i o n upon t h e b a s i c e lements of the of fense charged 
i s e s s e n t i a l ; and t h e f a i l u r e to so i n s t r u c t c o n s t i t u t e s 
r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . " S t a t e v . La ine , 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah, 
1980) ( fn . omi t t ed ) (emphasis added) ; accord , S ta te v. Jones, 
657 P.2d 1263 , 1267 (Utah , 1982); S t a t e v . Reedy, 681 P.2d 
1251, 1252 (Utah, 1984). 
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A r e c e n t Colorado case he ld t h a t ". . .a t r i a l court 
i s under an o b l i g a t i o n to i n s t r u c t the ju ry p r o p e r l y , • . . , 
and a f a i l u r e to do so as to every element of a crime charged 
i s p l a i n e r r o r / ' The Court t h e r e f o r e held t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s 
f a i l u r e to o b j e c t to the improper i n s t r u c t i o n would not bar 
review of the al leged e r r o r . Defendant's conviction was reversed 
because the jury was not c l ea r ly informed tha t a culpable mental 
s t a t e i s an element of second degree k idnapp ing . Chambers v* 
P e o p l e , 682 P.2d 1173 , 1176-1177 ( C o l o . , 1984) ( c i t a t i o n s 
o m i t t e d ) (emphasis added) ; accord , People v . Ford, 60 Cal .2d 
772, 36 C a l . R p t r . 620, 388 P.2d 892, 906 (1964), c e r t , d e n . , 
377 U.S. 940, 84 S.Ct . 1342, 12 L.Ed.2d 303 (1964) ; S t a t e v . 
Doe, 100 N.M. 481, 672 P.2d 654, 656 (1983) ( f a i lu re to i n s t r u c t 
on an e s s e n t i a l element of the crime is j u r i s d i c t i o n a l and may 
be ra ised for the f i r s t time on appea l ) . 
Utah a l s o fol lows t h i s r u l e . "Notwi ths tanding the 
a p p e l l a n t ' s f a i lu re to object to the jury i n s t ruc t ion on criminal 
t r e s p a s s , we are required in t h i s case to pass upon and determine 
h i s f i r s t p o i n t of e r r o r [ r e g a r d i n g a ju ry i n s t r u c t i o n ] t o 
p r e v e n t mani fes t i n j u s t i c e . " S t a t e v . Les ley , s u p r a . Since 
t h e c h a l l e n g e d i n s t r u c t i o n in L e s l e y m i s s t a t e d the law of 
c r i m i n a l t r e s p a s s , the Court r eve r sed a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n 
on tha t charge. Ici a t 82. 
In t h i s c a s e , t h e j u r y was neve r i n s t r u c t e d t h a t 
payment of legal fees and medical expenses was not a crime under 
t h e s t a t u t e . They were never informed as to the elements of 
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the statutory exceptions to the criminal elements* As both 
defendant and the prosecutrix testified (Tr. 14-15, 220-221, 
223) , the sums discussed ($2,000 to $5,000 according to the 
prosecutrix (Tr. 15)) were always in the context of legal fees 
and medical expenses. Neither witness ever stated that defendant 
would be receiving part of these funds for her assistance in 
placing a child for adoption with the prosecutrix. (Tr. 71) 
It was thus essential that the jury be fully informed as to the 
statute's elements of the crime as well as its exceptions, 
particularly in light of the Court's instruction that "[y]ou 
are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this 
trial and the law as stared to you by me." Instruction to 
the Jury No. 5 (emphasis added). (R. 42; see Addendum 4.) The 
Court, of course, was merely restating §77-17-10(2), U.C.A. 
(1953, as amended 1980), which provides "(2) The jury may find 
a general verdict which includes questions of law as well as 
fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the 
court." Addendum 6 (emphasis added). 
Because the jury is required to follow the law as 
stated by the Court, the trial court in this case had the 
affirmative duty to instruct the jury as to both the elements 
of the crime and the exceptions thereto. Its failure to do 
so was plain error resulting in a manifest injustice particularly 
since the facts brought out at trial are insufficient to support 
a conviction under §76-7-203 as discussed in Argument I, supra. 
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I I I 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DENIED 
DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. 
As a r e s u l t o f t h e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of h e r 
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d t h e r i g h t t o c o u n s e l 
g u a r a n t e e d by t h e S i x t h and F o u r t e e n t h Amendments t o t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 12 of t h e U t a h 
C o n s t i t u t i o n . The U t a h S u p r e m e C o u r t h a s r e c e n t l y h e l d t h a t , 
i n o r d e r t o c h a l l e n g e a c o n v i c t i o n on t h e b a s i s of i n e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l , " i t i s t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b u r d e n t o show: 
( 1 ) t h a t h i s c o u n s e l r e n d e r e d a d e f i c i e n t p e r f o r m a n c e i n some 
d e m o n s t r a b l e manner , and (2) t h a t t h e outcome of t h e t r i a l would 
p r o b a b l y h a v e b e e n d i f f e r e n t b u t f o r c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r . Cod ianna 
v . M o r r i s , U t a h , 6 6 0 P . 2 d 1 1 0 1 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . S e e a l s o , U n i t e d 
S t a t e s v . C r o n i c , 466 U . S . 6 4 8 , 104 S . C t . 2039 , 80 L . E d . 2 d 657 
( 1 9 8 4 ) ; S t r i c k l a n d v . W a s h i n g t o n , 46b U . S . 6 6 8 , 104 S . C t . 2052 , 
80 L . E d . 2 d 6 7 4 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . " S t a t e v . G e a r y , 707 P . 2d 6 4 5 , 646 
( U t a h , 1 9 8 5 ) . 
An a c c u s e d i n a c r i m i n a l c a s e h a s " t h e r i g h t t o h a v e 
c o m p e t e n t c o u n s e l who w i l l t a k e such a c t i o n s and p r e s e n t w h a t e v e r 
d e f e n s e s and i n t e r p o s e w h a t e v e r o b j e c t i o n s he c a n i n h o n e s t y 
a n d g o o d c o n s c i e n c e j u s t i f y i n t h e i n t e r e s t of h i s c l i e n t . " 
S t a t e v . Gray , 601 P . 2 d 9 1 8 , 920 ( U t a h , 1979) ( f n . o m i t t e d ) . 
D e f e n s e c o u n s e l c o m m i t t e d s e v e r a l e r r o r s i n h i s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of d e f e n d a n t . F i r s t l y , he f a i l e d t o o f f e r any 
p r o p o s e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s e x p l a i n i n g t h a t payment of a t t o r n e y ' s 
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fees and medical expenses in connection with an adoption is not 
illegal under the statute, nor did he object to the court's 
instructions to the jury which omitted the exception elements 
of §76-7-203 from the explanation of the elements necessary for 
conviction. As discussed in Arguments I and II, supra, this 
failure was extremely prejudicial to defendant's defense. At 
several points in the testimony, the witnesses stated that sums 
between $2,000.00 and $5,000.00 were the estimated costs for 
medical expenses, while the attorney's fee would be $500.00. 
(Tr. 15, 40-42) Without an instruction as to all elements of 
the offense, including the exceptions for payment of medical 
and legal fees, it is possible that the jury could have 
determined that the proposed payment of legal and medical 
expenses violated the statute. 
Secondly, without objection by defense counsel, the 
prosecution questioned the complaining witness, Mrs. Watson, 
and her mother, Mrs. Jackson, in great detail about the purchases 
of various items needed for a new baby, including a crib, 
clothing, diapers, a car seat and toys. (Tr. 21-27, 30-32, 
134-136) This pathetic recital of dashed hopes was completely 
irrelevant to the issue of whether the complaining witness was 
going to receive a child for adoption from the defendant in 
consideration for the payment of money or other thing of value 
to the defendant. In addition, he failed to object to the 
introduction into evidence of the actual items purchased for 
the anticipated child. (Tr. 203) Both types of evidence should 
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have been excluded under Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence. (See 
Addendum 7.) As well as i r r e l e v a n t , the testimony of Mrs. Watson 
in p a r t i c u l a r was h igh ly p r e j u d i c i a l . Defendant was denied a 
f a i r t r i a l s i n c e the ju ry was allowed to observe a weeping, 
b rokenhea r t ed woman d i s c u s s , i tem by i tem, purchases made for 
a chi ld she never received. 
Thirdly, the jury heard testimony about the complaining 
w i t n e s s ' s emot ional s t a t e a f t e r she l ea rned she would not be 
a b l e t o a d o p t a c h i l d w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s i s t a n c e . Tania 
Leonard, a f r i end of Mrs. Watson ' s , was p e r m i t t e d to t e s t i f y , 
w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n , as t o how e m o t i o n a l l y d i s t r a u g h t t h e 
p r o s e c u t r i x was a f t e r she knew she would not be able to adopt 
Emlee. (Tr . 125-127) The complaining wi tness ' s emotional s t a t e 
was i r r e l e v a n t to e s t a b l i s h the crime charged and should have 
been e x c l u d e d . In a d d i t i o n , i t was h i g h l y p r e j u d i c i a l to 
d e f e n d a n t ' s case and even i f found to be re levant , should have 
been e x c l u d e d under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence . (See 
Addendum 7.) 
F o u r t h l y , t h r e e p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s were al lowed 
to t e s t i i r y as to hearsay inadmissible under Rule 802, Utah Rules 
of Ev idence ( s e e Addendum 7 ) , wi thou t o b j e c t i o n by defense 
counsel . Ronda Colvin, a co-employee of Mrs. Watson's, t e s t i f i e d 
as to Mrs. Watson 's e x p l a n a t i o n of her payment of Mrs. Verde's 
s h o t s ( T r . 1 1 0 ) , even though t h i s was c o n s i s t e n t with Mrs. 
Watson 's own t e s t i m o n y . (Tr . 98 -99) . Tania Leonard t e s t i f i e d 
t h a t Mrs. Watson told her (1) t ha t she was going to adopt a baby 
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through the defendant (Tr. 120); (2) that defendant had given 
Mrs. Watson a letter purporting to be from the expectant mother 
(Tr. 121); (3) that defendant had given Emlee to Mrs. Watson 
to adopt (Tr. 123); and (4) that the person with whom Mrs. Watson 
was having a telephone conversation was the defendant (Tr. 124). 
Ms. Leonard also testified that she called the children1s shelter 
to see if they had a baby named Emlee in their care; that the 
shelter had no such child (Tr. 126-127); and that she had 
discovered that Julie Verde did not work for Social Services. 
(Tr. 127) Detective Pat Smith of the Salt Lake City Police 
testified that the Utah State Hospital had no record of caring 
for Emlee1 s mother under the name defendant had given her. (Tr. 
182) All of the above statements are hearsay and inadmissible 
under any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Defense 
counselfs failure to object to their admission into evidence 
was prejudicial to defendant's right to a fair trial. 
Defendant believes that she has satisfied both parts 
of the Geary test to show ineffective assistance of counsel 
rising to the constitutional level of denial of her right to 
counsel. She has, as discussed above, demonstrated four areas 
in which her trial counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
her defense at trial. The extreme prejudice resulting from 
defense counsel's failure to ensure that the jury was instructed 
as to the exception to the offense of sale of a child was 
discussed in Arguments I and II, supra. The testimony of 
various witnesses regarding irrelevant evidence of baby purchases 
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and of the complaining wi tness ' s emotional s t a t e a f te r the crime 
was committed and r e g a r d i n g hearsay i n a d m i s s i b l e under any of 
t h e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e was p r e j u d i c i a l in the 
ex t r eme . In d i s c u s s i n g an i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel 
claim, the United Sta tes Supreme Court recent ly held— 
When a d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s a 
c o n v i c t i o n , the q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e r e 
i s a r e a s o n a b l e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t , absen t 
the e r r o r s , the f ac t f inde r would have had 
a r e a sonab l e doubt r e s p e c t i n g g u i l t . . . . 
In making t h i s determination, a court hearing 
an i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s c la im must cons ider the 
t o t a l i t y of the evidence before the judge 
or j u r y . Some of the fac tua l findings wi l l 
have been u n a f f e c t e d by t h e e r r o r s , and 
f a c t u a l f i n d i n g s t h a t were a f f e c t e d w i l l 
have been a f f e c t e d in d i f f e ren t ways. Some 
e r r o r s w i l l have had a p e r v a s i v e e f f ec t on 
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence, 
a l t e r i n g t h e e n t i r e e v i d e n t i a r y p i c t u r e , 
and some w i l l have had an i so l a t ed , t r i v i a l 
e f f e c t . Moreover, a v e r d i c t or conclusion 
only weakly suppor ted by the record i s more 
l i k e l y to have been a f fec ted by e r ro r s than 
one with overwhelming record support . 
S t r i c k l a n d v . Wash ing ton , 466 U.S. 668, 695-696, 104 S.Ct . 
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (emphasis added) . S t r i c k l a n d i s 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e in defendant 's case since the evidence 
aga ins t her was weak and the e r rors of counsel thus had a grea ter 
a f f e c t on t h e v e r d i c t than they o the rwise would. Under the 
s t a n d a r d s of SJ:£i£kJ!^]i<i , Geary and Gray, d e f e n d a n t has 
shown she was denied her r i g h t to counsel guaran teed by the 
United Sta tes and Utah Cons t i tu t ions . 
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IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
PERMITTING TESTIMONY THAT WAS IRRELEVANT, 
PREJUDICIAL AND CONFUSING TO BE ADMITTED 
OVER DEFENSE COUNSEL OBJECTION. 
The t r i a l c o u r t e r red in admit t ing i n t o evidence, over 
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l o b j e c t i o n , t h e s t a t e m e n t by t he p r o s e c u t r i x f s 
employer that the prosecutrix was emotionally upset after 
February 1, 1985, the date of the alleged offense, and that the 
prosecutrix attempted to commit suicide at some time thereafter. 
(Tr. 165) The standard for review of a t r ia l court ruling on 
evidentiary matters is abuse of discretion. State v. McLain, 
706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah, 1985). 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines 
"relevant evidence" as— 
evidence having any tendency to make 
the exis tence of any fact tha t is of 
consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than 
i t would be without the evidence. 
(See Addendum 7.) Rule 402 s ta tes that , unless otherwise 
provided, relevant evidence is admissible, while irrelevant 
evidence is not. (See Addendum 7.) Rule 403 provides that even 
relevant evidence may be excluded " . . .if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. . . . " (See 
Addendum 7.) 
"The conduct of the person injured, subsequent to the 
offense, is irrelevant if not part of the res gestae. . . ." 
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §635, p. 489. "The term 'res gestae1 
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.may be defined. . .as the circumstances, facts and 
declarations which grow out of the main fact and serve to 
illustrate its character, and which are so spontaneous and 
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of 
deliberation or fabrication." 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law §662(1), 
pp. 660-661 (fns. omitted, emphasis added). 
Under this analysis, whether the prosecutrix was 
emotionally distraught to the point of suicide after learning 
she would not be able to adopt a child with defendant's 
assistance is irrelevant to the issue as to whether, on February 
1, 1985, defendant violated §76-7-203. Conviction under this 
statute requires proof that a person sold or disposed of, or 
attempted to do so, a child "in consideration for the payment 
of money or other thing of value" and that such payment did 
not fall under the statutory exceptions to this offense. 
Here, there was no evidence as to when the suicide 
attempt occurred or any proof that the attempt was actually part 
of the res gestae. The evidence does not shed light on whether 
the defendant actually disposed of a child and was going to 
benefit personally from such placement. Dr. Barton's testimony 
should have been excluded under Rule 402 as irrelevant. 
In addition, it was excludable under Rule 403 because 
of its prejudicial nature and the likelihood that the jury would 
confuse the issues to be determined by them. The issue was not 
whether the prosecutrix believed that she was going to adopt 
a child with defendant's assistance, but whether defendant 
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a c t u a l l y p laced a c h i l d with the prosecu t r ix "in considerat ion 
of the payment of money or other thing of va lue . " 
The t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e have been excluded 
because i t was not r e l e v a n t to the proof of the offense al leged 
to have been committed and was p re jud ic i a l and l i ke ly to confuse 
t h e i s s u e s . The t r i a l c o u r t thus abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n by 
p e r m i t t i n g Dr . B a r t o n t o t e s t i f y as to t h e p r o s e c u t r i x ' s 
emotional s t a t e and suicide attempt a f te r the date of the al leged 
o f f e n s e . Because of the po t en t i a l for extreme prejudice l i ke ly 
from such a d i s c l o s u r e , d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n shou ld be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The e r r o r s d i s c u s s e d above w a r r a n t r e v e r s a l of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n . Defendant t h e r e f o r e urges the Court 
to r e v e r s e her c o n v i c t i o n for v io la t ion of §76-7-203 and remand 
the case back to the t r i a l cour t . Defendant also asks the Court 
to rule on the admiss ib i l i t y of the p r o s e c u t r i x ' s emotional s t a t e 
and suicide attempt even if the case i s reversed on other grounds 
s i n c e t n i s w i l l p rov ide guidance to the t r i a l cour t when the 
case i s r e t r i e d . 
Respectfully submitted t h i s 15th day of Apr i l , 1986. 
A 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
M 
MARGO L. JAMES 
Of Counsel 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Section 76-7-203, U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1973) 
2. August 20, 1985, letter from Van O. Austin, M.D., Clinical 
and Forensic Psychiatry, and Robert J. Howell, Ph.D., Clinical 
and Forensic Psychology, Utah State Hospital, to Hon. Homer F. 
Wilkinson, Judge, Third District Court 
3. Judgment, Sentence (Commitment), September 5, 1985 
4. Instructions to the Jury 
5. Section 55-8a-l(4), U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1984) 
6. Section 77-17-10(2), U.C.A. (1953, as ainendea 1980) 
Section 77-35-19(c), U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1980) 
7. Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Rule 401 
Rule 402 
Rule 403 
Rule 801 
Rule 802 
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ADDENDUM 1 
§76-7-203, U.C.A. (1953, as amended 1973) 
76-7-203. Sale of child.—Any person, while having custody, care, con-
trol, or possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, or attempts to 
sell or dispose of, any child for and in consideration of the payment of 
money or other thing of value is guilty of a felony of the third degree; 
provided, however, this section shall not make it unlawful for any person, 
agency, or corporation to pay the actual and reasonable maternity, con-
nected medical or hospital and necessary living expenses of the mother 
preceding and during confinement as an act of charity, so long as payment 
is not made for the purpose of inducing the mother, parent, or legal guard-
ian to place the child for adoption, consent to the adoption, or co-operate 
in the completion of the adoption. 
ADDENDUM 2 
1885 29 1583 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
100 Years Of Service 
August 20, 1985 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
Judge of the Third District Court 
24 0 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
re: VERDE, Julie 
Case Number: CR85-534 
Dear Judge Wilkinson: 
The following is a report on Julie W. Verde, whom you committed to 
this hospital on August 1, 1985 for a thirty-day evaluation. Her evaluation 
has consisted of multiple psychiatric interviews, psychological test-
ing, physical examination, psychosocial interviews, observation of her 
functioning in the treatment setting, and presentation before the clinical 
staff. Although she has been pleasant during this evaluation, she has 
been less than honest. 
We find that Julie Verde is not mentally ill. Her thought processes, 
mood, affect, and ability to perceive and interpret reality are each 
appropriate. There is no evidence of organic brain dysfunction. There 
are signs of reactive depression which is related to her current legal 
situation. 
We do not feel that inpatient mental health treatment is indicated. 
She does have significant personality problems and if placed on probation 
she could benefit from counseling as part of her probation agreement. 
Social S6rviC$S *n Equal opportunity Employer Seymour P Steed, Ed 0.. Superintendent 
1300 East Center 
uuage Homer F. Wilkinson 2 August 20, 1985 
We feel that she could be satisfactor!ly managed if placed on probation, 
and do not feel that she would benefit from incarceration. 
Sincerely, 
VOA:lc 
b. (k<tiy\, nr 
Van 0. Austin, M.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychiatry 
ltd-
Robert J. Howell, Ph.D. 
Clinical and Forensic Psychology 
Enclosures: Psychiatric evaluation 
Social case history 
Psychological assessment 
cc: Ted Cannon, Esq. - Salt Lake County Attorney 
Alan Frandsen, Esq. - Defense attorney 
Joanne Jennings - Adult Probation and Parole 
Byron Stark - Salt Lake County Clerk's Office 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AlLjf t1 l*C'UO (t 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
(COMMITMENT) 
? Count No. . 
\ Honorable . 
f Clerk 
1 Reporter 
1 Railiff • 
Data 
/ : 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
G.A. CHI IDS 
ALAN SMITH 
GROVER MEDLEY 
/ A '" . ' > -
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by &k jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
O plea of no contest^of the offense of ^ *>^ C /V /f il ft L-tdf , a felony 
of the JZLLL deflf^eT 0 a c?a^?!l!?!5%inisdemeanor, being now present in court ahdft^ady for sentence and 
represented b 
of the above o 
he State being represented by. Ct ttstfU , is now adjudged guilty 
enced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
• yfa maximum mandatory term of 
y^not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D ofnot less than five years and which may be for life; 
D jlot to exceed years; 
. years and which may be for life; 
\0 and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $- p^/V fP 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $_ to 
D such sentence is to run concurrently with 
• such sentence is to run consecutively with 
• upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) 
Q 
are hereby dismissed. 
%t Defendant is granted a stay of the above (b prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and un.jrier the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of / / , ^//.Xi^^ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
D Commitment shall issue . 
DATED this day of 19 /*-
APPROVED AS TO FORM: S* '7 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
** 
" Defense Counsel 
Page / of 
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' • • / f> ' * ' > ^ ' ^ /CR ' ' ' /Honorable A '™ 
'/J ; ., 
Judgment/State v. 
CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
0 Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Dept! of Adult Probation & Parole. - , , \ -7% 
GT Serve ' M . ' ; - - ^ , y - ' c k , , ^ » , " • : ' * 
in the Salt Lake County Jail commencing / ^ / * * ^ * /4/ 
CT Pay a fine in the amount of $_-J D at a rate to be determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole; or a at the rate of 
& Pay restitution in the amount of $ ; or El in an amount to be determined by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; D at a rate of ; or • at a rate to be determined by 
the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or treatment as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Enter, participate in, and complete the program at 
D Participate in and complete any D educational; and/or D vocational training D as directed by the 
Department of Adult Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Participate in and complete any training D as directed by the Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole; or D with 
D Submit person, residence, and vehicle to search and seizure for the detection of drugs. 
D Submit to drug testing. 
D Not associate with anyone who illegally uses, sells, or otherwise distrubutes narcotics or drugs. 
• Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise distributed illegally. 
• Not use or possess non-prescribed controlled substances. 
D Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
D Submit to testing for alcohol use. 
• Take antabuse a as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
• Maintain full-time employment. 
D Obtain and maintain full-time employment or full-time schooling. 
• Maintain full-time employment or obtain and maintain full-time schooling. 
• Defendant is to have no contact nor associate with 
• Defendant's probation may be transferred to under the Interstate Compact as approved 
by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole. 
D Complete hours of community service restitution as directed by the Department of Adult Probation 
and Parole. - ^ 
0 Complete hours of community service restitution in lieu of _ days in jail. 
D Defendant is to commit no crimes. 
D Defendant is ordered to appear before this Court on for a review of this sentence 
D 
D 
• 
D 
D 
• — 
DATED this day of ~~ ** ; * ' , 19. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Page _ £ _ of _: 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JULIE WARREN VERDE, 
Defendant 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant JULIE WARREN VERDE 
is charged by the Information which has 
been duly filed with the commission of SALE OF A CHILD 
The Information alleges: 
SALE OF A CHILD, a Third Degree Felony, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about February 1, 1985, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 203, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, 
Julie Warren Verde, a party to the offense, did have 
custody, care, and control or possession of a child, and 
did sell, dispose of, or attempt to sell or dispose of, 
a child for and in consideration of the payment of money 
or other thing of value. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. C R 85-534 
R, 40 
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INSTRUCTION NO. £ 
It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the 
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to 
follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that 
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this 
court and the defendant's plea of ,fnot guilty11. This duty you 
should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passioi 
or prejudice against him. You must not suffer yourselves to be 
biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been 
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been fi 
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to 
stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and yoL 
are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them 
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in 
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids 
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion 
prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the State of 
Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and 
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider 
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you wil 
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such 
verdict may be. The verdict must express the individual opinion 
of each juror. 
R% 42 
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INSTRUCTION NO,\Z 
Before you can convict the defendant, Julie Warren 
Verde, of the crime of Sale of a Child, a Felony of the Third 
Degree as charged in the Information, you must find from the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements 
of t|haf£ crime: 
1. That on or about the 1st day of February, 1985, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Julie Warren 
Verde, had custody, care, control or possession of any child; and 
2. That the defendant: 
a. sold or disposed of, or 
b. attempted to sell or dispose of said child; and 
3. That the defendant did so: 
a* for and in consideration of the payment of money, 
or 
for other thing of value; and 
4. That the defendant committed such act intentionally 
or knowingly. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and 
all of the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict the defendant. On the other 
hand, if the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of 
said elements then you should find the defendant not guilty. 
Note: This is identical to plaintiffls R* 49 
requested instruction #1, R. 31 
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INSTRUCTION NO. fi 
Under the laws of the State of Utah, a person commits 
the crime of Sale of a Child when the actor has custody, care, 
control or possession of any child, and the actor sells or disposes 
of, or attempts to sell or dispose of said child, and the actor 
does so for and in consideration of the payment of money or other 
thing of value. 
Note; This is identical to plaintiff's 
requested instruction #8, R. 38 
R, 50 
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ADDENDUM- 5 
§55-8a-l, U.C.A, (1953, as amended 19841 
55-8a-l. "Child placing9* defined — License requirement — Limitations on 
unlicensed individuals — Enforcement actions — Civil penalty for violation 
— Collection and disposition. (1) For purposes of this chapter, child placing is 
the receiving, acceptance, or providing custody or care for any child under 18 years, 
temporarily or permanently, for the purpose of finding a person to adopt the child 
or placing the child temporarily or permanently in a home for adoption or foster 
home placement 
(2) No person, agency, firm, corporation or association, or group children homes 
may engage in child placing, or solicit money or other assistance for child placing, 
without having a valid written license from the Division of Family Services. 
(3) An attorney, physician, or other person may assist a parent in identifying 
or locating a person interested in the adoption of a child of the parent, or assist 
a person in identifying or locating a child to be adopted; provided that no payment, 
charge, fee, reimbursement of expense, or exchange of value of any kind, or promise 
or agreement to make the same, may be made for any assistance. No attorney, phy-
sician, or any other person may issue or cause to be issued any card, sign, or device 
to any person, or cause, permit, or allow any sign or marking on or in any building 
or structure, or announce or cause, permit, or allow any announcement to appear, 
in any newspaper, magazine, directory, or on radio or television, or advertise by 
any other means that the attorney, physician, or other person is available to pro-
vide assistance. 
(4) No provision of this chapter precludes payment of fees for medical, legal, 
or other lawful services rendered in connection with the care of a mother, delivery 
and care of a child, or lawful adoption proceedings; nor may any provision of this 
chapter abrogate the right of procedures for independent adoption as provided by 
law. 
(5) The Division of Family Services or any interested person may commence 
an action in the district court to enjoin any person, agency, firm, corporation, or 
association violating Subsections (2) or (3). 
(6) A county attorney or the state attorney general shall institute legal action 
as necessary to enforce the provisions of this section, when informed of any alleged 
violation. If the county attorney does not take action within 30 days after being 
informed, the attorney general may be requested to take action, and shall then 
institute legal proceedings in place of the county attorney. 
(7) In addition to the remedies provided in Subsections (5) and (6), any person, 
agency, firm, corporation, or association violating Subsection (2) or (3) shall forfeit 
all proceeds identified as resulting from the transaction, and may also be assessed 
a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. Every act in violation 
of Subsection (2) or (3), including every placement or attempted placement of a 
child, is a separate violation. 
(8) (a) All amounts recovered as penalties under Subsections (7) and (8) shall 
be placed in the general fund of the prosecuting county, or in the state General 
Fund if the state attorney general prosecutes. 
(b) If two or more governmental entities are involved in the prosecution, the 
penalty amounts recovered shall be apportioned by the court among the entities 
according to their involvement 
(9) A judgment ordering the payment of any penalty or forfeiture under Sub-
sections (7) or (8) constitutes a lien when recorded in the judgment docket and 
has the same effect and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in 
a civil action. 
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ADDENDUM 6 
7-17-1Q, U,C,A, (1953, as amended 1930) 
77-17-10 Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. (1) In a jury 
trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, questions of fact 
^ 2 ^ S iurv may find a general verdict which includes questions of law 
as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court 
7 - 3 5 - 1 9 , U,C,A, ( 1 9 5 3 , a s amended 198Q). 
77-35-19. Rule 19 — Instructions, (a) At the close of the evidence or 
at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file 
written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth 
in the request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished 
to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action 
upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be 
given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the 
court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given 
and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement 
what part of the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the 
court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are 
the exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court 
has instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation 
upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
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ADDENDUM 7 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
RULE 401 
DEFINITION OF "RELEVANT EVIDENCE" 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action .more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence. 
RULE 402 
RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; IRRELEVANT EVI-
DENCE INADMISSIBLE 
H^Jt^ffK^o?? i s aimis* ible> except as otherwise provided by the Constitu-
tion of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Utah, statute, or by these 
rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this State. Evidence which is not rele-
vant is not admissible. 
RULE 403 
EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, 
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 801 
DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal 
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if 
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing 
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the witness denies having made the state-
ment or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut 
an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving 
him; or 
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and 
is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or 
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or 
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning 
the subject, or (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter 
within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the 
relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course 
and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
RULE 802 
HEARSAY RULE 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules. 
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